成员提出透明度相关议题的具体建议

（一）成员对于提升货物贸易政策透明度的建议

2019年7月，美国联合包括澳大利亚、加拿大和欧盟在内的成员在货物贸易委员会就如何提升货物贸易政策的透明度提出建议。该建议在强调WTO秘书处和贸易政策审查机制发挥监督作用的同时，还要求对成员未能及时履行告知义务进行相应的惩罚。^[171]而发展中成员由于其自身人力和财力的限制，面临履行告知义务的实际障碍，因此提出“包容的方式”^[172]，要求充分考虑发展中成员的能力限制，并强调发展中成员对《农业协定》、GATS、TRIPS和关税的告知义务履行高度关注。发展中成员认为，在要求成员履行告知义务的同时，WTO应在机制上提升其透明度。^[173]

（二）成员对提升争端解决机制透明度的建议

2019年10月，包括美国、加拿大、澳大利亚、阿根廷在内的一些成员向WTO提交专门文件^[174]，要求提升贸易争端解决机制的透明度。该文件建议，提升WTO所有成员参与争端解决程序的能力，使其能够参加所有的听证和文件，从而帮助那些不经常参加争端解决机制的成员更好地了解这一机制。文件进一步建议，DSU在保护各成员秘密信息的基础上进行修改，建立提升争端解决透明度机制，即“对书面提交的材料进行公开”及“在争端解决程序的司法裁判方和秘书处的帮助下，将当事方陈述向WTO成员和公众开放”。^[175]

成员要求完善相关机制、提升WTO透明度，是全球化经济体系下的必然选择。成员在国际经济体系下，与其他成员通过跨国资本、产业链和跨境贸易流动紧密相连。尽管包括非洲在内的一些发展中成员在20世纪80年代以来南北经济融合的过程中遭到了边缘化，但历史已经不止一次证明，融入世界经济是国家实现工业化和经济快速发展的必要条件。然而，国际经济的融合带来了溢出效应。一国的政策和措施对他国经济会产生影响。更为重要的是，随着各国市场的开放，一国的政策和措施会给他国企业进入该国带来影响。因此，无论从宏观经济的角度，还是从微观产业发展的角度，成员都需要深入了解他国，特别是主要大国的经济政策。

WTO作为成熟的多边贸易机制，为协调成员的贸易政策以及其他经济政策发挥着重要作用。尽管WTO正经历谈判功能失灵和大国单边主义的考验，多边贸易机制遭遇危机，但WTO仍然不可替代。成员要求WTO多边贸易机制在提升透明度议题上发挥更为积极的作用，再次说明WTO多边经济政策协调的不可或缺的作用。信息的充分公开和成员的有效沟通将会帮助WTO继续为世界经济的稳定和可预见性提供制度保障。这将从根本上增加WTO的制度性优势，为争取成员的信任和支持创造条件。

【注释】

[1]GATT， Article XVII.

[2]United States—Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from Korea （DARMs）（WT/DS296）.

[3]United States—Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from Korea （DARMs）（WT/DS296/AB/R）.（2005-06-27）.note 179.

[4]United States—Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors （DARMs）（WT/DS296/AB/R）.（2005-06-27）.para.112.

[5]Canada—Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products （WT/DS103）.

[6]Canada—Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products （WT/DS103/ AB/R）.（1999-10-13）.para.97.

[7]Korea—Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels （WT/DS273）.

[8]Korea—Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels （WT/DS273/R）.（2005-03-07）.para.7.50.

[9]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379）.

[10]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379/R）.（2010-10-22）.para.8.5.

[11]Ibid.， para.8.4.

[12]Ibid.， para.8.5.

[13]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379）， China First Submission， para.61.

[14]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379/R）.（2010-10-22）.para.8.22.

[15]Ibid.， para.8.25.

[16]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379/R）.（2010-10-22）.para.8.63.

[17]Ibid.， para.8.94.

[18]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379/AB/R）.（2011-03-11）.para.254.

[19]Ibid.， para.262.

[20]Ibid.， para.247.

[21]Ibid.， para.247.

[22]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379/AB/R）.（2011-03-11）.para.21.

[23]Ibid.， para.27.

[24]United States—Definitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China （WT/DS379/AB/R）.（2011-03-11）.para.134.

[25]Ibid.， para.317.

[26]Ibid..

[27]Ibid.， para.322.

[28]沈木珠.我国双反成功案例剖析及其启示—以DS379为例.法学杂志.2014（4）：89.

[29]USTR.USTR Statement Regarding the WTO Appellate Body Report in Countervailing Duty Dispute with China.（2011-03-25）： 3.https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/Mar25%20Stmt%20US%20AD-CVD%20fin.pdf.

[30]WTO.Dispute Settlement Body.Minutes of Meeting Held on March 25， 2011 （WT/DSB/M/294）.para.103-128.

[31]United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China （WT/DS437）.

[32]United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China （WT/DS437/R）.（2014-07-14）.para.7.66.

[33]Ibid.， para.7.67.

[34]United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China （WT/DS437/R）.（2014-07-14）.para.7.75.

[35]United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China （WT/DS437/RW）—Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU—Final Report of Panel.（2018-03-21）.para.7.2.2.3.4.

[36]Ibid.， para.7.292.

[37]United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China （WT/DS437/AB/RW）— Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU—Final Report of Panel.（2019-07-16）.para.5.105.

[38]潘晓明.美国贸易保护主义政策下的东亚经济融合.国际问题研究.2019（4）：127-128.

[39]USTR.Statement by Ambassador Dennis Shea： China’s Disruptive Economic Model and Implications for the WTO.（2018-07-26）： 4.

[40]Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， Japan， and the European Union.（2018-09-15）.https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint-statement- trilateral.

[41]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）.para.I.A.ii.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[42]Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， European Union and Japan.（2019-05-23）.https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/may/joint-statement-trilateral- meeting.

[43]Ibid..

[44]Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， Japan， and the European Union.（2019-01-09）.https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/january/joint-statement- trilateral-meeting.

[45]Akande Charles.Ministers brainstorm on WTO reform in Ottawa.The Geneva Watch， 2018， 18（26）： 2.

[46]Akande Charles.Ministers brainstorm on WTO reform in Ottawa.The Geneva Watch， 2018， 18（26）： 2.

[47]WTO.Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO—Communication from Canada （JOB/GC/201）.（2018-08-24）： 5.

[48]WTO.Strengthening the Deliberative Function of the WTO—Discussion Paper—Communication from Canada，（JOB/GC/211）.（2018-12-14）： 3.

[49]Ibid.

[50]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）.para.2.35.

[51]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）.para.2.36.

[52]Dollar David， Ryan Hass， Jeffery A Bader.Accessing U.S.-China Relations 2 Years into the Trump’s Presidency.（2019-01-15）.Brookings Institute.https：//www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/15/ assessing-u-s-china-relations-2-years-into-the-trump-presidency/.

[53]Gamberoni Elisa， Newfarmer Richard.Trade Protection： Incipient but worrisome trend.Baldwin Richard，Evenett Simon.The Collapse of Global Trade， Murky Protectionism and the Crisis： Recommendations for G20.Center for Economic Research， 2009： 50.

[54]Disputes by Agreements.（2019-09-11）.https：//www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm.

[55]Fergusson Ian F.World Trade Organization Negotiations： The Doha Development Agenda.Congressional Research Services Report for Congress， 2011， No.RL 32060： 2.

[56]WTO.Trade Policy Review： United States—Minutes of the Meeting （December 17 and 19， 2018）（WT/TPR/M/382）.

[57]WTO.Fisheries Subsidies： Working Document—Communication from the Chair （TN/RL/W/274/Rev.6）.（2018-11-14）.

[58]WTO.Negotiation on Fisheries Subsidies.[2019-06-12].https：//www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/ fish_e/fish_e.htm.

[59]USTR.2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Trade Annual Report of the President of United States on the Trade Agreements Program.（2019-03）： 2.

[60]USTR.Statement of United States by Ambassador Dennis Shea at the 14thWTO Trade Policy Review of United States of America： 7.

[61]Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， Japan， and the European Union.（2018-09-15）.https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint-statement- trilateral.

[62]Edwards John.Getting Back to Basics on Subsidies： A first step for U.S.—China Trade Talks.（2019-04-18）.https：//warontherocks.com/2019/04/getting-back-to-basics-on-subsidies-a-first-step-for-u-s-china-trade-talks/.

[63]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）.para.I.A.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[64]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）.para.I.A.i.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[65]Ibid..

[66]Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， Japan， and the European Union.（2018-09-15）.https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint- statement-trilateral.

[67]Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， Japan， and the European Union.（2019-01-09）.https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/january/joint-statement- trilateral-meeting.

[68]Akande Charles.Ministers brainstorm on WTO reform in Ottawa.The Geneva Watch， 2018， 18（26）： 1.

[69]Joint Communique of the Ottawa Ministerial on WTO Reform.（2018-10-25）： 2.

[70]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）.para.2.14.

[71]GATT 1947， Article XVIII： 2.

[72]Constantine Michalopoulos.Developing Countries in the WTO.London： Palgrave， 2001： 2.

[73]GATT 1947， Article XXXVII： 1（a）.

[74]Page Sheila， Peter Kleen.Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization.Overseas Development Institute， 2005： 8.

[75]Hudec Robert E， Finger J Michael.Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System.Cambridge： Cambridge University Press， 2011： 64.

[76]Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization： 9.

[77]WTO.Committee on Trade and Development， Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in the WTO Agreements and Decisions，（WT/COMTD/W/239）.（2018-10-12）.para.1.5.

[78]González Anabel.Bridging the Divide between Developed and Developing Countries in WTO Negotiations.Peterson Institute of International Economy.（2019-03-12）.https：//www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy- watch/bridging-divide-between-developed-and-developing-countries-wto.

[79]World Bank Country and Lending Groups.[2019-09-21].https：//datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/ articles/906519.

[80]Page Sheila， Peter Kleen.Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization.Overseas Development Institute， 2005： ix.

[81]Page Sheila， Peter Kleen.Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization.Overseas Development Institute， 2005： x.

[82]WTO.Communication from the United States.A Non-Differentiated WTO： Self-declared development status risks institution irrelevance （WT/GC/W/757）.（2019-01-19）： 8-10.

[83]USTR.2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Trade Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Agenda.（2019-03）： 102.

[84]WTO.Procedures to Strengthen the Negotiating Function of the WTO （WT/GC/W/764）.（2019-02-15）.

[85]Ibid..(www.xing528.com)

[86]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）.para.II.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[87]Ibid.， para.II：（a）.

[88]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）.para.II：（b）.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[89]Ibid..

[90]Ibid.， para.II：（c）.

[91]Joint Statement on Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of the United States， Japan， and the European Union.（2018-09-15）.https：//ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/joint-statement-trilateral.

[92]WTO.Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO—Communication from Canada （JOB/GC/201）： 5.

[93]Ibid.： 6.

[94]WTO.Communication from China， India， South Africa， The Bolivarian Republic Venezuela， Laos People’s Democratic Republic， Plurinational State of Bolivia， Kenya， Cuba， Central African Republic and Pakistan.The Continued Relevance of Special and Differential Treatment in Favor of Developing Members to Promote Development and Ensure Inclusiveness （WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2）.（2019-03-04）.

[95]WTO.Communication from China， India， South Africa， The Bolivarian Republic Venezuela， Laos People’s Democratic Republic， Plurinational State of Bolivia， Kenya， Cuba， Central African Republic and Pakistan.The Continued Relevance of Special and Differential Treatment in Favor of Developing Members to Promote Development and Ensure Inclusiveness （WT/GC/W/765/Rev.2）.（2019-03-04）.part 2.

[96]Ibid.， para.6.2.

[97]Ibid.， para.6.2.

[98]Ibid.， para.6.3.

[99]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）.para.2.32.

[100]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）.para.2.34.

[101]Wolf Martin.Why Rigged Capitalism Is Damaging Liberal Democracy.（2019-09-18）.Financial Times.https：//www.ft.com/content/5a8ab27e-d470-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77.

[102]Manyika James， Susan Lund， Jacques Bughin， Jonathan Woetzel， Kalin Stamenov， Dhruv Dhingra.Digital Globalization： The new era of global flows.New York： Mckinsey Global Institute.2016： 10.

[103]Manyika James， Susan Lund， Jacques Bughin， Jonathan Woetzel， Kalin Stamenov， Dhruv Dhingra.Digital Globalization： The new era of global flows.New York： Mckinsey Global Institute.2016： 2.

[104]Ibid.： 7.

[105]Azevêdo Roberto.The Conversation on Digital Trade and E-Commerce Concerns Us All.（2019-04-01）.https：//www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra254_e.htm.

[106]Manyika James， Susan Lund， Jacques Bughin， Jonathan Woetzel， Kalin Stamenov， Dhruv Dhingra.Digital Globalization： The new era of global flows.New York： Mckinsey Global Institute.2016： 10.

[107]USTR.2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Trade Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Agenda.（2019-03）： 64.https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2018_ Annual_Report.pdf.

[108]Botwright Kimberley.Davos Participants Call for Digital Trade Deal.（2019-01-23）.https：//www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/davos-participants-call-for-digital-trade-deal/.

[109]Schaake Marietje.Toward a digital trade strategy.（2017-11-29）.European Parliament Report， A8-0384/2017.http：//www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-0384_EN.pdf.

[110]WTO.Ministerial Conference， Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce （WT/MIN （98）/DEC/2）.（1998-05-25）.

[111]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce （WT/L/1056）.（2019-01-25）.

[112]WTO.Working Programme on Electronic Commerce—Non-Paper from the United States （JOB/GC/94）.（2016-7-04）.para.2.4.

[113]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from Japan—Addendum （INF/ECOM/20）.（2019-07-12）： 6.

[114]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from Brazil （INF/ECOM/27）.（2019-07-09）： 2.

[115]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from China （INF/ECOM/19）.（2019-04-24）： 3.

[116]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）.para.2.22.

[117]WTO.Working Programme on Electronic Commerce—Non-Paper from the United States （JOB/GC/94）.（2016-7-04）.para.2.1.

[118]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—EU Proposals for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating to Electronic Commerce （INF/ECOM/22）.（2019-04-26）.para.2.5.

[119]WTO.Working Programme on Electronic Commerce—The Commerce Moratorium and Implications on Developing Countries—Communication for India and South Africa （WT/GC/W/774）.（2019-06-03）.

[120]Sledz Robert.Italy Expands VAT Reporting Requirements to Include E-Commerce Facilitators， Thomson Reuters.（2019-05-09）.https：//tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/italy-expands-vat-reporting-requirements-to-include-e- commerce-facilitators/.

[121]Súnico Guadalupe Díaz.Insight： The new Spanish Digital Services Tax—A strange combination of value creation and geolocalization.（2019-05-10）.Bloomberg Tax.https：//news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report- international/insight-the-new-spanish-digital-service-tax-a-strange-combination-of-value-creation-and-geolocalization.

[122]WTO.Working Programme on Electronic Commerce—Non-Paper from the United States （JOB/GC/94）.（2016-07-04）.para.2.2.

[123]USTR.2019 Trade Policy Agenda and 2018 Trade Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Agenda.（2019-03）： 64.https：//ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2019_Trade_Policy_Agenda_and_2018_Annual_ Report.pdf.

[124]WTO.Working Programme on Electronic Commerce—Non-Paper from the United States （JOB/GC/94）.（2016-7-04）.para.2.3.

[125]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from the United States （INF/ECOM/23）.（2019-04-26）： 4.

[126]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—EU Proposals for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating to Electronic Commerce （INF/ECOM/22）.（2019-04-26）.para.2.7.

[127]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from China （INF/ECOM/19）.（2019-04- 24）： 4.

[128]Ibid..

[129]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—EU Proposals for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating to Electronic Commerce （INF/ECOM/22）.（2019-04-26）.para.2.8.

[130]2017年7月，美国三大信用卡公司之一Equitax报告其数据库信息发生大规模泄漏，约有1.43亿信用卡消费者的信息被盗窃。2018年，美国社交网站脸书的用户数据大规模泄漏，事件仍在持续发酵。

[131]Connor Nuala O’.Reforming the U.S.Approach to Data Protection and Privacy.（2018-01-30）.Digital Cyberspace Policy Program， Council on Foreign Relations.https：//www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data- protection.

[132]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from China （INF/ECOM/19）.（2019-04- 24）： 3.

[133]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from the United States （INF/ECOM/23）.（2019-04-26）： 3.

[134]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from Canada—Concept Paper： Building Confidence and Trust in Digital Trade （INF/ECOM/29）.（2019-05-09）： 3.

[135]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—EU Proposals for WTO Disciplines and Commitments Relating to Electronic Commerce （INF/ECOM/22）.（2019-04-26）.para.2.1.2.

[136]Ibid.， para.2.2.3.

[137]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from China （INF/ECOM/19）.（2019-04-24）： 1.

[138]Ibid.： 3.

[139]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Text Proposal—Communication from Japan （INF/ECOM/ 20）.（2019-04-26）： 5.

[140]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from the United States （INF/ECOM/23）.（2019-04-26）： 6.

[141]WTO.Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce—Communication from China （INF/ECOM/19）.（2019-04- 24）： 1.

[142]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）： 5.

[143]World Economic Forum.Global Future Council on International Trade and Investment： Strategic Brief for Trade Ministers on the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.[2019-10-20].http：//www3.weforum.org/docs/Strategic_ Brief_Trade_Ministers_WTO_Dispute_Settlement_Mechanism_pagers_2018.pdf.

[144]DSU， Article 3.2.

[145]WTO.Minutes of Meeting—Meeting Held in Center of William Rappard on 31 August 2017（WT/DSB/ M/400）.（2017-10-31）.para.7.3.

[146]US Mission in the WTO.Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body， Geneva.（2019-02-25）： 12.https：//geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Feb25.DSB_.Stmt_.as- deliv.fin_.public.pdf.

[147]USTR.2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Trade Annual Report of the President of United States on the Trade Agreements Program.（2019-03）： 3.

[148]US Mission in the WTO.Statements by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body， Geneva.（2019-02-25）： 12.https：//geneva.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/290/Feb25.DSB_.Stmt_.as- deliv.fin_.public.pdf.

[149]USTR.Statement of United States by Ambassador Dennis Shea at the 14thWTO Trade Policy Review of United States of America.（2018-12-17）.

[150]WTO.Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO—Communication from Canada （JOB/GC/201）： 3.

[151]WTO.Strengthening and Modernizing the WTO—Communication from Canada （JOB/GC/201）： 3.

[152]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）.para.I（i）.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[153]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）.para.I （vi）.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[154]Ibid.， para.II.

[155]WTO.Communication from the European Union， Canada， China， India， Norway， New Zealand， Switzerland， Australia， Republic of Korea， Iceland， Singapore and Mexico to the General Council （WT/GC/W/752）.（2018-12-26）： 1.

[156]Ibid.： 2.

[157]Ibid..

[158]WTO.Communication from the European Union， Canada， China， India， Norway， New Zealand， Switzerland， Australia， Republic of Korea， Iceland， Singapore and Mexico to the General Council （WT/GC/W/752）.（2018-12-26）.

[159]Ibid..

[160]WTO.Agreement to Establish the World Trade Organization： Decisions on Notification Procedures.[2019-11-10].https：//www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/33-dnotf_e.htm.

[161]Ngobi George William.The Specific Trade Concern Mechanism of the TBT Committee and the WTO TBT Agreement Implementation.CUTS International， 2016： 2.

[162]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）： 9-10.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[163]Ibid.： 10.

[164]European Union.Concept Paper， WTO Modernization—Introduction to future EU proposals on rule making.（2018-06-29）： 10.http：//trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/september/tradoc_157331.pdf.

[165]Ibid..

[166]WTO.Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO Agreements—Communication from the United States （JOB/CTG/10/Rev.1）.（2018-03-12）.para.4（a）.

[167]WTO.Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements under WTO Agreements—Communication from the United States （JOB/CTG/10/Rev.1）.（2018-03-12）.para.9-10.

[168]WTO.Strengthening the Deliberative Function of the WTO—Discussion Paper—Communication from Canada，（JOB/GC/211）.（2018-12-14）： 1.

[169]WTO.China’s Proposal on WTO Reform： Communication from China （WT/GC/W/773）.（2019-05-13）： 6.

[170]Ibid..

[171]WTO.Procedures to Enhance Transparency and Strengthen Notification Requirements in WTO Agreements—Communication from Argentina， Australia， Canada， Costa Rica， the European Union， Japan， New Zealand， the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan， Penghu， Kinmen and Matsu and the United States （JOB/CTG/14/ Rev.2）.（2019-06-27）.

[172]WTO.An Inclusive Approach to Transparency and Notification Requirements in the WTO—Communication from Cuba， India， Negeria， South Africa， Tunisia， Uganda and Zimbabwe （JOB/CTG/15）.（2019-06-27）： 3.

[173]Ibid.： 4-5.

[174]WTO.Joint Statement on the Importance of Transparency in WTO Dispute Settlement—Communication from Argentina， Australia， Brazil， Canada， Costa Rica， New Zealand， Norway， Singapore， Switzerland， the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan， Penghu， Kinmen and Matsu and the United States （WT/GC/W/785）.（2019-10-22）.

[175]WTO.Joint Statement on the Importance of Transparency in WTO Dispute Settlement—Communication from Argentina， Australia， Brazil， Canada， Costa Rica， New Zealand， Norway， Singapore， Switzerland， the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan， Penghu， Kinmen and Matsu and the United States （WT/GC/W/785）.（2019-10-22）.